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Articles

Inconceivable: Status, Contract, And The
Search For A Legal Basis For Gay &
Lesbian Parenthood
Libby Adler*

ABSTRACT
With the fight for same-sex marriage in the rearview mirror, legal
advocates have turned their attention to legally securing parenting rights
for gay and lesbian people against this new landscape. Adults in same-sex
couples often share parenting responsibilities for children who are
biologically related only to one of them. What, short of adoption, should
establish the legal tie between a child and a non-biologically related adult?
A consensus answer to that question has emerged among scholars and
advocates of gay and lesbian family law: intent to parent and socially
functioning as a parent. Using as an entry point the recent decision of the
* Professor of Law and Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, Northeastern University.
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U.S. Supreme Court in Pavan v. Smith, which extended the “parentage
presumption” to married lesbian co-parents, this Article examines the
consensus answer closely, characterizing the proposed shift as a move
from status (biological parenthood) to contract (parenthood by intent or
implied in fact). It invites the reader to consider such a move with
particular mindfulness of the drawbacks that may accrue in the most
vulnerable sectors of the gay and lesbian community.
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INTRODUCTION

The law reform strategy of the major LGBT advocacy organizations
seems premised on an identity of interests between gay men and lesbians.
Much of the time, the interests of these two constituencies are in fact
aligned, as is the case with anti-discrimination protections. A recent
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, however, exposes the limits of this
alignment.
At the end of the 2016 term, the Supreme Court issued Pavan v.
Smith1 to little fanfare. The case reversed a decision of the Arkansas
Supreme Court2 regarding the importance of Obergefell v. Hodges3 to an
Arkansas statute governing birth certificates. Pavan secured a long-sought

1. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017).
2. Smith v. Pavan, 505 S.W.3d. 169 (Ark. 2016), rev’d per curiam, 137 S. Ct. 2075
(2017).
3. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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parenting right for married lesbian couples, ensuring that when one partner
gives birth using anonymous sperm donation, the other is a presumed coparent.4
With the campaign for same-sex marriage in the United States now
in the rearview mirror, advocates have directed their attention to securing
parenting rights for LGBT people against this new landscape. One glaring
obstacle to legally securing same-sex parenting arises from the
impossibility of a same-sex couple—comprising two cisgender persons5—
producing a biological child by combining their gametes. To overcome
this problem, legal scholars interested in advancing the status of gay and
lesbian non-biological parents have urged a turn to contractual concepts
for determining parenthood—namely, the intent to parent and functioning
socially as a parent. So far, scholarship extolling the promise of an actual
shift—one that is already well underway in the doctrine—has largely
focused on the benefits to gay and lesbian people seeking to raise children.
None have observed that the shift itself, one that has occurred in many
fields of law, effectively proposes a move from status to contract, nor have
any grappled deeply with the possible costs of such a move for subparts of
the internally diverse gay and lesbian population.
Pavan represents an important victory for married lesbians, but it also
raises a question too infrequently posed in the context of LGBT progress:
who is left behind, and to what extent have their interests been
undermined? Pavan does absolutely nothing for married gay men, and
may even contribute to their degraded status as parents. The interests of
gay and lesbian people may in fact turn out to be more fragmented—and
even conflictual—than this. In addition to different biological capacities,
gay and lesbian people are differentiated by race, class, region, marital
status, and lifestyle preferences.
Using Pavan as a launching pad, this Article argues that the solution
that legal scholars are advancing to overcome the obstacle of biological
relation poses differential risks to differently situated members of the gay
and lesbian community. Intent and function as bases for parenthood, while
likely to advance the interests of the most privileged sectors of the gay and
lesbian community, may come to disserve that community’s most
marginalized members on axes of race, class, region, and sexual lifestyle.
4. See infra note 42 for discussion of a more limited reading of Pavan.
5. The problem discussed in this Article relies on the assumption that the men and
women under consideration are cismen and ciswomen. A transwoman might well be in a
position to biologically father a child and a transman might well be impregnated.
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After discussing the details and pertinence of this new Supreme Court
precedent, this Article traces some of Pavan’s antecedents to gain a deeper
understanding of its meaning for the law’s differential treatment of men
and women in the context of parenting. The Article then proceeds to situate
Pavan in the broader discussion among scholars of gay and lesbian family
law, focusing especially on the consensus around parental intent and
function. Finally, this Article interrogates the risks that grounding
parenthood in these contractual concepts poses to vulnerable sectors of the
gay and lesbian community.

II.

PAVAN V. SMITH

Arkansas law provides that when a child is born, the name of the
biological mother appears on the birth certificate.6 Further, when a married
woman gives birth, the name of the mother’s husband appears as the father
on the birth certificate,7 though there are two exceptions to this general
rule. First, if “paternity has been determined otherwise by a court of
competent jurisdiction,” the husband’s name will not appear.8 Second,
both spouses and a putative father could enter notarized affidavits
contradicting the presumption of the husband’s paternity.9
6.

Id.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(e) (2010) states that:
For the purposes of birth registration, the mother is deemed to be the woman
who gives birth to the child, unless otherwise provided by state law or
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction prior to the filing of the
birth certificate. The information about the father shall be entered as
provided in subsection (f) of this section. For the purposes of birth
registration, the mother is deemed to be the woman who gives birth to the
child, unless otherwise provided by state law or determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction prior to the filing of the birth certificate. The
information about the father shall be entered as provided in subsection (f)
of this section.

7. “If the mother was married at the time of either conception or birth or between
conception and birth the name of the husband shall be entered on the certificate as the father
of the child, unless . . . .” ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(f)(1) (2010).
8. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(f)(1)(A) (2010).
9. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(f)(1)(B) (2010) states that:
The mother executes an affidavit attesting that the husband is not the father
and that the putative father is the father, and the putative father executes an
affidavit attesting that he is the father and the husband executes an affidavit
attesting that he is not the father. Affidavits may be joint or individual or a
combination thereof, and each signature shall be individually notarized. In
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This is a typical state law regime,10 and is traceable back at least to
the eighteenth-century British jurist Lord Mansfield, who observed “a
common-law rule of evidence that disqualifies a husband and wife from
testifying as to nonaccess—lack of sexual relations—between them where
the legitimacy of a child born or conceived during their marriage is at
issue.”11 While Lord Mansfield’s Rule is a rule of evidence, it generally
“operates in conjunction with a legal presumption that a child born or
conceived during the marriage is legitimate.”12 Indeed, once the
exceptions are considered, it might be most accurate to say that the
evidentiary rule has effectively evolved into a widespread presumption in
American states.
An additional provision of Arkansas law—Section 9-10-201(a)—
renders the presumption of the husband’s paternity conclusive under one
circumstance: “Any child born to a married woman by means of artificial
insemination shall be deemed the legitimate natural child of the woman
and the woman’s husband if the husband consents in writing to the
artificial insemination.”13 This provision admits no exceptions. Its use of
the term “natural” makes it clear that the consenting husband of a woman
who conceives through artificial insemination of donor sperm need not
adopt the resulting child to secure his paternal rights. His paternity is
conclusively presumed. This rule, too, predominates among the states.14
Family law scholars and practitioners have been wondering, at least
since Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health,15 the case that led
such event, the putative father shall be shown as the father on the certificate
and the parents may give the child any surname they choose.
Id.
10. See Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2339
(2017) [hereinafter NeJaime, Nature].
11. Note, Prohibiting Nonaccess Testimony by Spouses: Does Lord Mansfield’s Rule
Protect Illegitimates?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1457, 1457 (1977).
12. Id. at 1458.
13. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(a) (2010). Note that the word “anonymous” does not
appear in the section. As Joanna L. Grossman explained, “[m]ost state sperm donor laws
do not differentiate between known and unknown sperm donors on their face.” Joanna L.
Grossman, Constitutional Parentage, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 322 (2017). Courts are
left to determine whether the statute applies identically in the two circumstances. Wary of
attributing too much meaning to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pavan and cognizant that
if a known donor were to intervene in such a case and assert his paternity it would raise
additional issues, I assume that the decision is limited to instances of anonymous sperm
donation unless and until the holding is explicitly extended, or generally applied, to cases
involving known donors.
14. NeJaime, Nature, supra note 10 at 2291, 2367–69.
15. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d. 941 (Mass. 2003).
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Massachusetts to become the first U.S. jurisdiction to confer marital status
on same-sex couples, whether the parentage presumption would apply in
the case of two women. If one of the women in a married lesbian couple
gives birth using anonymously donated sperm, is the other woman’s
parentage presumed? The parentage presumption preserves no less a
fiction in the case of a heterosexual married couple that relied on thirdparty sperm to conceive, but could the fiction bear the weight of a female
spouse? Does the conspicuous impossibility of a woman biologically
fathering a child render the fiction unsustainable in a lesbian context?
Pavan involved two married lesbian couples.16 One of the spouses in
each couple gave birth to a child conceived using anonymously donated
sperm.17 Both couples sought to have the other spouse named on the birth
certificate, but in both cases, the Arkansas Department of Health (ADH)
named only the birth mother.18
The couples launched a challenge in state court, where a sympathetic
trial judge ordered ADH to issue amended birth certificates recognizing
each birth mother’s female spouse as a parent and declaring parts of
subsections 20-18-401 (e) and (f) to be unconstitutional in light of
Obergefell.19 Nathaniel Smith, the Director of ADH, appealed to the
state’s highest court, but agreed in the meantime to provide the families
with amended birth certificates.20
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s constitutional
holding.21 It reasoned that while Obergefell addressed the marital relation,
Pavan concerned the parent-child relation.22 Citing a dictionary definition
of the term “father” as “a man who has begotten a child,” the court
observed that while the governing statute instructed that a husband would
be named as the father on a birth certificate, it also provided that a court
could determine that another man was the father and that affidavits from

16. A third couple presented a related, but slightly different, legal issue not taken up
by the U.S. Supreme Court and therefore, not discussed in this Article. This third couple
was not yet married at the time of the child’s birth, so the question was instead whether the
couple could legitimize the child by marrying subsequent to the birth. See Smith v. Pavan,
505 S.W.3d 169, 172–73 (2016). The relevant section of the Arkansas code is 20-18406(a)(2), which contains the rules for legitimation.
17. See Smith, 505 S.W.3d. at 172.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 173.
20. See id. at 173 n.1.
21. See id. at 172.
22. See id. at 178.
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the relevant parties could prevent operation of the presumption.23 The
critical policy consideration animating the statute, therefore, was the
biological relationship between parent and child.24
An affidavit submitted by Melinda Allen, the Vital Records Registrar
at ADH, bolstered this conclusion. Allen stated that “[i]dentification of
biological parents through birth records is critical to ADH’s identification
of public health trends, and it can be critical to an individual’s
identification of personal health issues and genetic conditions.”25 Allen
further attested that even in cases of adoption, where an amended birth
certificate reflecting the names of the adoptive parents is issued, the
original birth certificate is maintained under seal so that biological
parenthood can be discovered for health purposes.26 Because biological
relation was central to the statutory scheme, and because “[i]t does not
violate equal protection to acknowledge basic biological truths,”27 the
Arkansas Supreme Court determined that the statute should be upheld.
The Arkansas Supreme Court did not specifically rule on the
constitutionality of Section 9-10-201(a), the section specifying that a
“husband” who consents in writing to his wife’s artificial insemination
shall be named on the birth certificate. Smith, the Director of ADH,
actually conceded in the trial court that use of the term “husband” in that
section was probably “constitutionally infirm” after Obergefell.28 The
complaint did not frame that term as the constitutional defect, however,
and the trial court did not address it. Then, because that issue was not
technically on appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court also declined to
consider it.29
The couples’ petition for a writ of certiorari arrived at the United
States Supreme Court in February 2017. At the end of June, the writ was
granted and the case decided in one fell swoop: no briefs, no oral
argument—a.k.a. summary reversal. The main opinion in Pavan was per
curiam, representing the positions of at least four and not more than six
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. Id. at 179.
26. See id.
27. Smith, 505 S.W.3d. at 181.
28. Id. at 181.
29. See id. The decision elicited three separate dissents from the seven-member court,
including a concurrence-dissent by the state’s Chief Justice, who opened with two verses
from Bob Dylan’s The Times They Are A-Changin’. “Come senators, congressmen / Please
heed the call / Don’t stand in the doorway / Don’t block up the hall . . . .” Id. at 183 (Brill,
C.J., concurring and dissenting).
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justices. Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, and Alito were in dissent. In fewer
than five full pages, the justices behind the per curiam opinion found
that—contrary to the contention of the state supreme court—”Arkansas
law makes birth certificates about more than just genetics.”30 The opinion
pointed specifically to the provision granting a consenting husband a place
on the birth certificate if his wife was artificially inseminated with donor
sperm, notwithstanding the fact that he “is definitively not the biological
father.”31 The Court concluded that “Arkansas has . . . chosen to make its
birth certificates more than a mere marker of biological relationships . . .
[and] [h]aving made that choice, Arkansas may not, consistent with
Obergefell, deny married same-sex couples that recognition.”32
It is not clear exactly what, if anything, was struck down here. The
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court and
“remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion,”33
but did not squarely declare any provision of Arkansas law to be
unconstitutional. Since the couples had already obtained amended birth
certificates, there was also no instruction from the Court on that point.
Justice Gorsuch, for the three dissenters, fixed his attention first on
the majority’s decision to use summary reversal.34 That mechanism is
supposed to be reserved for matters in which “the law is settled and
stable,” which Justice Gorsuch did not think the issue in this case was.35
His second objection was that, if we zoom out, we can see that the
overall statutory scheme is designed to record biological relationships for
legitimate public health purposes, such as tracking genetic disorders.
Naming the birth mother’s husband on the birth certificate where the
biological father is in fact a sperm donor is an exception. The plaintiffs’
challenges were framed to disrupt the biologically-based birth certificate
regime.36 Why didn’t the plaintiffs just attack the constitutionality of the
“husband” language in the exception? Considering the entire statutory
scheme, Justice Gorsuch, much like the Arkansas Supreme Court, thought
that Obergefell did not govern—Nguyen v. INS37 did. Nguyen, which is
discussed in greater detail below, upheld a section of the Immigration and
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017).
Id.
Id. at 2079.
Id.
See id. at 2079 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id.
See id. at 2080.
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
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Nationality Act that provided separate rules for unmarried biological
mothers and unmarried biological fathers seeking to convey their
American citizenship to a child born abroad.38 The case was premised on
the significance of biological differences concerning pregnancy and birth.
Given Nguyen, Justice Gorsuch thought, after the statute’s larger purpose
was considered, biology also settled the question in Pavan.
Finally, Justice Gorsuch noted that by the time of the decision,
Arkansas had already put the names of the birth mothers’ spouses on the
birth certificates, so there was no longer any remedy to be had.39 What, he
asked, was supposed “to happen on remand that hasn’t happened
already”?40 Fair question. Should Arkansas have considered its birth
certificate statute invalid? That is not specified in the per curiam opinion.
Perhaps the majority would have liked to see the statutory term “husband”
construed to mean “spouse” and applied without regard to the sex of the
birth mother’s partner, but the majority did not state this precisely.
The question in Pavan regarding the operation of the parentage
presumption in the case of a married lesbian couple needed an answer.
Apparently thinking the safest course is to use glue and nails, LGBT
advocacy organizations, such as GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders
(GLAD) have been advising married lesbian couples to make use of
second parent adoption,41 a mechanism that predates same-sex marriage
and enables same-sex couples to secure parenting rights to a child that is
biologically related to only one of them. Pavan seems to relieve married
lesbians of the need to go through a second parent adoption where the birth
mother is impregnated using anonymous sperm donation.42 Still, Pavan
38. See id. at 73.
39. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2080 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
40. Id.
41. See Second Parent Adoption, GLAD, https://www.glad.org/overview/secondparent-adoption/massachusetts/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2017).
42. According to one reading of Pavan, the holding is limited to birth certificates and
does not apply to “the presumption of parentage itself” because “a birth certificate is merely
prima facie evidence of the information stated within.” Jessica Feinberg, Whither the
Functional Parent?: Revisiting Equitable Parenthood Doctrines in Light of Same-Sex
Parents’ Increased Access to Obtaining Formal Legal Parent Status, 83 BROOKLYN L.R.
55, 77 n.125 (2017). If lower courts abide by this conservative reading, then the paternity
presumption has not actually been extended to lesbian spouses and Pavan accomplishes
very little. Cf. id. at 88. The distinction between parentage and prima facie evidence thereof
seems an awfully slim reed, however, upon which to deny lesbian spouses the presumption
after Pavan. My own reading, which I hope is not too hasty or incautious, is that Pavan
extends the parentage presumption to female spouses in any jurisdiction that applies it to
male spouses (i.e., all 50 states, see Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing Parenthood Through
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may not have been the best case for the Supreme Court to review because
the remedy was provided before the case left Arkansas, and the statutory
presumption in the case of donor-insemination-with-spousal-consent was
not technically on appeal. If the Supreme Court had not granted certiorari
in Pavan, surely a case with similar facts would have arrived before long.

III. MATERNAL PRIMACY
Read one way, Pavan is an advance not only for lesbians qua
lesbians, but also for sex-based equality. Whether the biological mother’s
spouse is male or female, that spouse is entitled to the same treatment. The
case distinguishes itself from cases such as Obergefell, however, in that it
effectively, if silently, leaves a legal distinction between married lesbians
and married gay men. That is because the unquestioned assumption upon
which both the decision and the underlying statutory scheme rely is the
primacy of the biological mother. The biological mother’s relationship to
the child is never open to question; the fact of her having given birth
conclusively provides her with parental rights.
Pavan is hardly the first case to accord primacy to biological mothers
over biological fathers, though the distinction typically arises in the
context of non-marital parents. A long line of cases addresses the rights of
non-marital fathers. The foundational case of Lehr v. Robertson43 involved

the
UPA
(2017),
127
YALE
L.J.F.
589
(2018),
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/author/courtney-g-joslin). On my reading, an attempt by a
state to distinguish between being recorded as the parent and acquiring the status of a parent
would undercut the central message of Pavan, that after Obergefell, the spouse of the birth
mother must be treated equally, regardless of whether that spouse is male or female. The
Arizona Supreme Court seems to agree. Shortly after Pavan came down, the Arizona
Supreme Court applied it to a case that raised essentially the same question, albeit in the
context of a dissolution. McLaughlin v. Jones ex rel. County of Pima, 401 P.3d 492 (2017),
concerned a married lesbian couple that planned for a child borne by one of them using
donor sperm. Id. at 494. The couple executed a co-parenting agreement specifically
contemplating the continuation of the relationship between the non-biological parent and
child in the event of a break-up. Id. When the child was two, however, the couple split up
and the biological mother attempted to prevent contact between her child and her expartner, arguing that the Arizona presumption applied only to men. Id. at 495–96. The
Arizona court, specifically rejecting the application of Nguyen while citing Obergefell,
Pavan, and Morales-Santana, see infra notes 71–81 and accompanying text, determined
that to save the statute’s constitutionality, it must apply the presumption equally to male
and female spouses. McLaughlin, 401 P.3d at 500–02.
43. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
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the adoption of a child, Jessica M., by her biological mother’s husband,
whom the mother married eight months after Jessica’s birth.44 Jonathan
Lehr, the putative biological father, argued that the adoption was invalid
because he was never notified that the adoption petition had been filed.45
New York, where the parties resided, maintained a “putative father
registry.”46 A man who filed with that registry was entitled to notice before
the adoption of the child whom he asserted he fathered, but Lehr never
registered.47 Lehr could also have, but did not (according to the
majority48), seek to have his paternity adjudicated, have his name inscribed
on Jessica’s birth certificate, live openly with his daughter and hold
himself out as the father, provide a sworn statement by the mother that he
was the father, or marry Jessica’s mother.49 Additionally, Lehr did not
provide Jessica or her mother with any financial support.50 Biological,
unmarried mothers, the Court conceded, need not do anything under the
statute to merit notice of adoption, and also need not do anything special
to benefit from due process protections as a parent.51 Unmarried fathers,
however, could be treated differently. The Court noted:
[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood by ‘com[ing] forward to participate in the
rearing of his child,’ . . . his interest in personal contact with his child
acquires substantial protection under the due process clause . . . But the
mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent
constitutional protection.52

The unwed mother’s biological relationship is sufficient to warrant due
process protection, but the unwed father’s is not.53 Additionally, in the
44. See id. at 250.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 250–51.
47. Id.
48. The dissent provides a quite different statement of the facts. According to the
dissent, Lehr made a genuine effort to support Jessica and her mother emotionally and
financially, but the mother evaded contact, refused to accept money, and married another
man before Lehr could secure his parentage. See id. at 268–70 (White, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 251–52 (majority opinion).
50. Id. at 252. Financial support was not a requirement of the state law, but it was a
factor that the Court considered. Again, according to the dissent’s telling, Lehr offered
support but was rebuffed. See id. at 269 (White, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 266–67.
52. Id. at 261 (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979)).
53. See also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (upholding a Georgia adoption
law that dispensed with the need for consent of the unmarried, biological father).
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absence of a “substantial relationship” between father and child, no equal
protection problem arises.54
Unmarried maternal primacy also infects immigration law, though
recent developments may have muted the hierarchy. In Nguyen v. INS,55
the Court upheld a requirement of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) that governed conveyance of U.S. citizenship by unwed fathers to
their children born abroad.56 An unwed father had to take an affirmative
step in order to convey his citizenship that neither an unwed mother nor a
married parent had to take. While his child is a minor, the unwed citizen
father had to legitimate his child (i.e., by marrying the child’s mother),
acknowledge his paternity in writing and under oath, or have his paternity
established by a court.57
The defendant, Tuan Anh Nguyen, was the son of Joseph Boulais—
an American citizen working for a military contractor in Vietnam—and a
Vietnamese woman.58 Boulais brought Nguyen back to the United States
and raised him, but never took any of the formal steps necessary to convey
his citizenship.59 When Nguyen reached adulthood, he was convicted of
54. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266–68.
55. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(3) (2012 & Supp. 2017).). Note the or; he had to take one of
these three steps.
57. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 53.
58. Id. at 57.
59. Id. According to Nguyen’s brief:
Joseph Boulais, an American citizen by birth . . . lived in the United States
continuously through his early adulthood . . . . In 1960, at age 23, Boulais
enlisted in the United States Army. He served in Germany, receiving an
honorable discharge in January 1963.
Following his discharge from the army, Boulais relocated to Vietnam. In
1969, while he was working for Pacific Architect Engineer, a military
contractor, he began a relationship with a Vietnamese citizen, Hung Thi
Nguyen. As a result of that relationship, Joseph Boulais’s son, Tuan Anh
Nguyen (“Nguyen”), was born in Vietnam on September 11, 1969.
Soon after his son’s birth, Boulais’s relationship with Hung Thi Nguyen
soured. Thus, from early infancy, Tuan Anh Nguyen lived with his father,
who later married another Vietnamese national.
In 1975, Saigon fell to North Vietnamese troops. Six year-old Nguyen
escaped from Vietnam with the family of Boulais’s wife. Within a few
months, Nguyen was paroled into the United States as a refugee, and was
reunited with Boulais. In the chaos surrounding the fall of Saigon and his
family’s separation, Boulais lost contact with Nguyen’s biological mother.
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crimes under state law and subject to deportation as a noncitizen.60 If
Nguyen’s mother had been the U.S. citizen, Nguyen would have acquired
her citizenship without the formal steps required of Boulais and would not
be deportable. Consequently, Nguyen and Boulais launched an equal
protection challenge based on sex.
For five justices, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the fact of biological
mothers necessarily being present at the time of birth meant that the sexbased distinction was based on a “real” difference and therefore survived
the equal protection challenge.61 The majority was persuaded that the sexbased distinction substantially furthered two important purposes. First, the
additional process ensured that the father was actually the father, unlike
“[i]n the case of the mother, [where] the relation is verifiable from the birth
itself.”62 Kennedy relied in part on the Lehr line of cases,63 which
rationalized differential treatment of unwed mothers and fathers. Second,
the sex-based distinction in the law afforded the child and citizen father an
“opportunity . . . to develop not just a relationship that is recognized, as a
formal matter, by the law, but one that consists of the real, everyday ties
that provide a connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the
United States.”64 For the mother and child, Kennedy thought, such an
opportunity “inheres in the very event of birth.”65 The father, however,
may not even know that the child exists due to the “9-month interval
between conception and birth.”66 The law could, therefore, impose an
additional step to facilitate the father-child relation.

She never again communicated with Boulais, and he does not know whether
she survived the war.
Since 1975, Boulais, his wife and Nguyen have lived as a family in the
United States. Nguyen adjusted his status to that of lawful permanent
resident in 1975 pursuant to the Indochinese Refugee Act. He never
returned to Vietnam. While Boulais provided financial support to Nguyen
throughout his minority, he did not legitimate or otherwise formally
establish his paternity prior to Nguyen’s 18th birthday. In 1997, Boulais
underwent a DNA test confirming that Nguyen is indeed his son.
Brief of Petitioners 4–5, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071) (internal
citations omitted).
60. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57.
61. Id. at 73.
62. Id. at 62.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 64–65.
65. Id. at 65.
66. Id.

ADLER - FINAL EDITS (DO NOT DELETE)

14

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

12/10/2018 4:52 PM

[Vol. 123:1

Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, as well as
Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas.67 Justice O’Connor came out
swinging in dissent, incensed at the sexist stereotyping, and the more
liberal justices (Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer) joined her.68 Justice
Kennedy swatted away the charge of stereotyping,69 insisting that the
difference in the law was based on biological reality and that to ignore it
“would be to insist on a hollow neutrality.”70
This very same Justice Kennedy, however, joined Justice Ginsburg’s
majority opinion in Sessions v. Morales-Santana,71 which reached a
contrary conclusion—it diminished the legal distinction between the
maternal and paternal biological relationship in the immigration context.
Morales-Santana involved a challenge to a subsection of the INA that
imposed a ten-year residency requirement on unmarried fathers seeking to
pass their U.S. citizenship to a child born abroad.72 In contrast, unmarried
mothers needed only to reside in the United States for a single year to
convey their citizenship.73 Luis Ramón Morales-Santana was born in the
Dominican Republic to a U.S. citizen father and non-citizen mother; his
parents were not married at the time of his birth and his father’s residency
in the United States was short of the statutory requirement by twenty
days.74 As a result, Morales-Santana did not derive citizenship from his
father and crimes he committed under the laws of New York rendered him
deportable.75 If the INA had applied a one-year residency requirement to
unwed fathers as it did to mothers, Morales-Santana’s father would easily
have satisfied the requirement and conveyed his U.S. citizenship to his
son, thereby preventing the deportation. Morales-Santana challenged this
sex-based distinction as a violation of equal protection.
Justice Ginsburg reviewed the history of the relevant sections of the
INA and found an underlying assumption that unwed mothers would
67. Id. at 56.
68. Id. at 74 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 68 (majority opinion).
70. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 64.
71. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
72. Id. at 1686. The statutory provision that applies to unwed U.S. citizen fathers is 8
U.S.C. § 1409(a) (2012 & Supp. 2017). That section refers back to 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2012
& Supp. 2017), where the rules for married citizens are set forth, and applies the same
residency requirement. Congress has since shortened the requirement to five years, but the
ten-year rule was in effect when Morales-Santana was born.
73. Unwed U.S. citizen mothers are governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c).
74. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1686.
75. Id. at 1688.
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“natural[ly]” be their children’s “sole guardian.”76 She described that view
as “stunningly anachronistic”77 and agreed with Morales-Santana that the
statutory distinction between unwed citizen mothers and unwed citizen
fathers violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.78
All of the justices, besides Justice Kennedy, who were on the Court
for both Nguyen and Morales-Santana, lined up the same way each time—
they either consistently saw an equal protection violation or consistently
rejected the challenge. For Kennedy, however, there was evidently some
basis for distinguishing between the two cases, though that basis is not
readily identifiable. Put in its best light, the sex-based distinction in the
law in Nguyen hewed closely to the biological facts of pregnancy and
childbirth, while in Morales-Santana, the distinction relied on the
assumption that unwed fathers disappear while unwed mothers wind up as
“sole guardians.”79 The former is biology, and therefore “real,” while the
latter is stereotyping.
Under scrutiny, this distinction disintegrates. Both the paternityestablishment requirement and the length of residency requirement emerge
at some attenuation from the facts of pregnancy and childbirth. Even the
rationale that the mother-child relation is evident from the birth falls apart
once you consider that the assertion of citizenship in each case occurred
years after and miles away from the birth.80 Both of these challenged
76. Id. at 1691–92.
77. Id. at 1693.
78. That was the good news for Morales-Santana. The bad news was that the majority
determined that it would overstep judicial authority to award him citizenship as a remedy.
Id. at 1698. Instead, the Court equalized unwed citizen mothers and fathers by invalidating
the shortened requirement for mothers, which is framed in the law as an exception to the
general rule. Id. at 1699. As a result, Morales-Santana was deportable as a noncitizen. Id.
at 1699–1701. Until Congress takes steps to reduce the length of the residency requirement
for all unwed citizen parents, the longer requirement governs.
Justice Ginsburg did not forget that unwed fathers must demonstrate their
commitment to their children. Id. at 1692 n.12. Morales-Santana’s father, José Morales,
supported his son, married the mother, and added his name to the birth certificate. Id.
Though it reads as dictum, Ginsburg observed in a footnote—citing Lehr—that Morales
“formally accepted parental responsibility for his son.” Id.
79. Id. at 1691.
80. Note that it was the birth, not the birth certificate, upon which Kennedy relied. If
it were the birth certificate, it would erode the sex-based distinction in the law he upheld,
requiring formality of both mothers and fathers. To stress this point, consider the French
provision for anonymous childbirth. A French woman may deliver a child anonymously
and request that her confidentiality be preserved. If, after two months, she does not reclaim
the child, “the birth has never officially taken place.” BRUNO PERREAU, THE POLITICS OF
ADOPTION: GENDER AND THE MAKING OF FRENCH CITIZENSHIP 172 n.94 (Deke Dusinberre
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statutory provisions rely on some obscure alloy of biology and
stereotyping.81
Taken together, Nguyen, Morales-Santana, and Pavan, represent a
rise, fall, and rise again of biological maternal primacy. Though the Court
issued its decision in Morales-Santana a mere two weeks before it issued
Pavan, and the two cases apparently represent the views of roughly the
same justices (the same three justices dissented, so there was at least a four
justice overlap in the majorities), the two decisions nonetheless point in
opposite directions. Morales-Santana disrupts maternal primacy and
Pavan entrenches it. Everyone was married in Pavan, so the Lehr strand
that runs through Nguyen—according to which unwed fathers can be
required to take steps not required of unwed mothers before enjoying
parental rights—does not apply in Pavan unproblematically. Still, the
current of biological maternal primacy courses through the set, excepting
only Morales-Santana, where Justice Ginsburg—founder of the ACLU
Women’s Rights Project and architect of equal protection law based on
sex—put her foot down. With Kennedy on Ginsburg’s side, MoralesSantana could almost be read to suggest that biological maternal primacy
is on the way out—but then came Pavan.82
The pending case of a married, gay male couple, Andrew and Elad
Dvash-Banks, who are seeking American citizenship for one of their twin
sons, could represent a real push in one direction or the other.83 Andrew is
a U.S. citizen and Elad is Israeli.84 A surrogate was implanted with

trans., MIT Press 2014). In the absence of an official record establishing the maternal
relationship, this law essentially puts an unidentified mother on the same footing as an
unidentified father, notwithstanding biological differences.
81. By the time of Morales-Santana, perhaps Kennedy shed a little of the motherchild romanticism that animated his opinions in such cases as Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 124 (2007). In Gonzalez, Justice Kennedy, for the conservative side of the Court,
upheld the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003. Id. at 168. The case was rife with
lamentations for an imagined pregnant woman’s grief over her abortion decision (“While
we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude
some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and
sustained . . . . Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.”). Id. at 159. Read together
with Nguyen, it is hard not to discern a certain sentimentality on the part of Justice Kennedy
regarding motherhood.
82. See infra Part II. Pavan relies on and entrenches biological maternal primacy by
making the presumption of parentage a function of marriage to the biological mother.
83. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Dvash-Banks v. U.S. Dep’t
of State (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2018) (No. 18-00523), https://www.immigrationequality.org
/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Dvash-Banks-Complaint-Filed.pdf.
84. See id. at ¶ 1. Andrew has dual citizenship in Canada. See id. at ¶ 39.
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anonymously donated ova fertilized with Andrew and Elad’s jointly
supplied sperm; she gave birth to fraternal twins in Canada.85 One twin is
genetically related to Andrew and the other is genetically related to Elad.86
Only the former was granted U.S. citizenship by the U.S. Department of
State.87 Officials treated the twins as “born out of wedlock.”88 A child of a
heterosexual married couple where only one parent is a U.S. citizen—as
we saw in Nguyen and Morales-Santana—is born with U.S. citizenship
status if certain minimum residency requirements are met.89 This rule may
originate in the assumption that the child is genetically related to both
parents, but as we have seen, the parentage presumption, especially its
applicability in the case of consented-to anonymous sperm donation, may
mean that the child is genetically related only to one. Andrew and Elad
seek to have their twins treated as born within wedlock.90 If the DvashBanks case were to reach the U.S. Supreme Court and come out in favor
of the couple and their son as an extension of Pavan, this would deal a
blow to maternal primacy and edge the status of gay male parenthood
closer to that of lesbian parenthood.
I am not, however, sanguine on behalf of the Dvash-Banks family.
Indeed, the most recent version of the Uniform Parentage Act (2017)
(UPA),91 while making numerous changes in furtherance of gender equity,
draws the line here: it maintains automatic parenting rights for a birth
mother and then presumes parentage for the birth mother’s spouse,92 but
the spouse of a male biological parent acquires no such presumption.
While the surrogate in Dvash-Banks is making no claim to parentage, such
policy tendencies as those represented in the UPA, as well as the politics
of international surrogacy, cannot help but emerge as significant. As a
result, we might expect to see a deepening conflict between gay male and
feminist/maternal interests.93
85. See id. at ¶ 2.
86. See id.
87. The U.S. embassy in Toronto made the determination. See id. at ¶ 4.
88. See id. at ¶ 4.
89. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 59; Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686
(2017). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2012 & Supp. 2017).
90. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 104, Dvash-Banks (No. 1800523).
91. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
92. See Joslin, supra note 42, at 609 (citing UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (a)(1)(A)
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017)).
93. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption
of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 276 (2006) (“I would
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As gay men form families and attempt to secure parenting rights,
Pavan does them no favors and arguably impedes their progress by silently
entrenching biological maternal primacy. Pavan grounds the second
parent’s rights in marriage to the birth mother, whose rights go entirely
unquestioned; birth mother rights serve as a premise rather than a
conclusion. A married gay male couple cannot possibly be treated the
same as a married heterosexual or lesbian couple unless and until the law
dispenses with that remarkably durable—if barely visible—starting place.
What would it mean to attack the tree at its root—the primacy of biological
motherhood?

IV. DE FACTO (AND OTHERWISE EQUITABLE) PARENTHOOD
Legal scholars have for some time been envisioning an answer to that
question. The prevailing line of argument seems to favor the interrelated
contractual concepts of intent and function, increasing protections for
parents who lack a biological connection to their child but who,
particularly in the context of assisted reproductive technologies (ART),
intended to parent and/or have functioned socially as a parent to an existing
child.
Perhaps the earliest scholar to become well-known for advocating
this kind of position is Nancy Polikoff. Polikoff tuned in to the limitations
of biology and marriage for lesbian couples long before those couples
could marry or adopt. Going back decades, she authored numerous articles
and a book advancing a version of family law that would recognize the
relationships that are functionally central to people’s lives. In a 1990
piece,94 Polikoff scanned existing doctrines recognizing non-biological,
non-adoptive, parent-child relationships and extracted useful theories for
advancing recognition of parent-child relationships based on intent and
function. She highlighted equitable estoppel, explaining:
find it impossible to conclude that the . . . pre-birth conduct [of two male co-parents] (or
anyone else’s behavior during that time) could so overwhelm the parental contributions of
the gestating woman that they would satisfy a functional test more certainly than she would.
As a result, nothing in this functional analysis answers the question how, at the time of
birth, a default rule could identify as a child’s two (and only two) parents a gay male
couple . . . .”) (emphasis added).
94. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood
to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78
GEO. L.J. 459 (1990).
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[f]unctional parents—including lesbian parents—may develop a parentchild relationship in several ways. A lesbian-mother family can hold
itself out as including two mothers. It can treat a child as part of both
mothers’ extended families. A child can have the last names of both
mothers. A legally unrecognized mother can contribute to the child’s
financial support and the legally recognized mother can accept such
payment. A written or oral agreement can exist between the two women
that they will jointly rear the child. Under any of these circumstances,
the legally unrecognized mother should be able to seek the legal status
of parent. She should be able to assert that by creating the parent-child
relationship and representing that child rearing was a joint endeavor, the
legally recognized mother has been estopped from denying the
functional parent the status of legal parent. 95

Since the advent of same-sex marriage, Polikoff has also forcefully argued
that marriage should not be a requirement in parentage determinations.96
She has even warned against relying on adoption for non-biological
parents.97 In distinguishing planned lesbian families from step-parent
families secured by adoption, Polikoff urged that “[a] lesbian couple . . .
plans for a child together. From before birth, the child-to-be has two
parents. The nonbiological mother is not a step-parent.”98 Polikoff’s work
consistently emphasizes the importance of consent99—meaning the formal
or informal agreement between adults to co-parent—and function as
evidence of consent.100
Other legal scholars have followed Polikoff’s lead.101 In his 2012
book, The Right to be Parents,102 Carlos Ball traced the evolution of the
95. Id. at 499.
96. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, The New Illegitimacy: Winning Backward in the
Protection of the Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 721,
722 (2012); NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL
FAMILIES UNDER LAW 123 (2008).
97. Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child:
Parentage Laws for the Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN.
J. C.R. & C.L. 201 (2009).
98. Id. at 206.
99. See id. at 233.
100. See id. at 237–38.
101. See, e.g., Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood By Pure Intention: Assisted
Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (2002)
(developing the concept of intent to parent and arguing that “the law should understand
intentional parenthood as subsumed by the notion of functional parenthood” for married
and unmarried people). Id. at 602.
102. CARLOS A. BALL, THE RIGHT TO BE PARENTS: LGBT FAMILIES AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF PARENTHOOD (2012). This book was dedicated in part to Nancy
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law granting or denying recognition to LGBT parents. Some of the stories
Ball recounts are harrowing, as legal standards rooted in unfounded
stereotypes and formalistic reliance on biology and marriage, threaten, and
in many cases destroy, emotional ties. In the progress toward recognition
of planned gay and lesbian-headed families, the increasing significance of
intent, consent, and function all feature prominently in Ball’s account.103
Douglas NeJaime has provided the most current and
comprehensively argued scholarship urging lawmakers and judges not to
“deny the importance of biological ties, but simply . . . to credit social
contributions as well” when making decisions about parental
recognition.104 Specifically, NeJaime favors placing an increased value
“on factors such as intent to parent, parental conduct, and family
formation.”105 “Same-sex family formation,” NeJaime observes, “features
a parent without a genetic or gestational connection to the child; therefore,
treating same-sex parents as equals demands recognition on social
grounds.”106
In a related article carefully tracing progress for gays and lesbians in
both marriage and parenting domains, NeJaime persuasively argued
“marriage equality can facilitate the expansion of intentional and
functional parentage principles across family law — not only inside but
also outside marriage, for both same-sex and different-sex couples.”107
NeJaime methodically demonstrated how LGBT advocates shrewdly drew
from case law recognizing biological but non-marital fathers as well as

Polikoff. See also Carlos A. Ball, Rendering Children Illegitimate In Former Partner
Parenting Cases: Hiding Behind the Façade of Certainty, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y
& L. 623, 656–61 (2012) (arguing that intent is not a sufficient guide without function).
103. See BALL, THE RIGHT TO BE PARENTS, supra note 102, at 83–114.
104. NeJaime, Nature, supra note 10, at 2264. See also BALL, THE RIGHT TO BE
PARENTS, supra note 102, at 139 (explaining that “[i]t is important . . . to distinguish the
argument that biology should not be solely determinative of parenthood from the
contention that biology should be irrelevant to that question. Supporters of lesbian and gay
parenting have never made the latter claim . . . . [A] biological link should be neither
necessary nor sufficient to claim parentage status.”).
105. NeJaime, Nature, supra note 10, at 2264.
106. NeJaime, Nature, supra note 10, at 2268. Note that biological maternity can be
fragmented into genetic and gestational. Fertile women for whom carrying a fetus presents
particular risks may resort to surrogacy for gestation only. Further, some lesbian couples
have divided biological responsibilities in order to feel that both mothers have contributed
to the production of a child. See AMY HEQUEMBOURG, LESBIAN MOTHERHOOD: STORIES OF
BECOMING 74 (2007).
107. Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 1185, 1190 (2016) [hereinafter NeJaime, New Parenthood].
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sperm donor cases recognizing marital but non-biological fathers to
reinvent parenthood on functional grounds.108 Pressing for de facto
parenthood featured prominently in this strategy.109
Massachusetts is among those U.S. jurisdictions to have ratified the
de facto parent doctrine,110 which affords a custody or visitation claim to
a non-biological, non-adoptive parental figure who
resides with the child and, with the consent and encouragement of the
legal parent, performs a share of caretaking functions . . . The de facto
parent shapes the child’s daily routine, addresses his developmental needs,
disciplines the child, provides for his education and medical care, and
serves as a moral guide.111
One of the two cases in which this doctrine was incorporated into
Massachusetts law, E.N.O. v. L.M.M.,112 concerned a child born through
108. See id. at 1193, 1196.
109. See id. at 1199.
110. For an assessment of each state’s degree of acceptance of the doctrine, see De
Facto Parent Recognition, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (Mar. 6, 2017),
https://www.lgbtmap.org/img/maps/citations-parents-de-facto.pdf.
111. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999).
112. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999). The other was Youmans v.
Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165 (Mass. 1999), which involved an appeal by a child’s father from a
court order of visitation with a maternal aunt who had served as the child’s sole guardian
for most of the child’s life. Youmans preceded E.N.O. by a week. The court in Youmans
invoked the American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, as
follows:
We use the terms “legal parent” and “de facto parent” proposed by the
Reporters on the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution. See ALI
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution § 2.03(l) (Tent. Draft No. 3
Part 1 1998) (approved at annual meeting May, 1998). The definition of “de
facto parent” states in relevant part:
“A de facto parent is an adult, not the child’s legal parent, who for a
period that is significant in light of the child’s age, developmental
level, and other circumstances,
“(i) has resided with the child, and
“(ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with
the consent of a legal parent to the formation of a de facto parent
relationship . . . regularly has performed
“(I) a majority of the caretaking functions for the child.”
Youmans, 711 N.E.2d at 167 n.3.
Observe the similarity of this doctrine to the estoppel doctrine proposed by Polikoff. Both
are equitable doctrines and they rely on roughly the same factors. Note also that in some
states, the de facto parent is effectively put on equal footing with, or perhaps becomes, a
legal parent, while in other states the de facto parent has a visitation but not a custody claim
against a legal parent. Some states have rejected equitable parenting doctrines altogether
as a violation of the legal parent’s constitutional prerogatives. See Grossman, supra note
13, at 333–39; see also Feinberg, supra note 42, at 66–68 (explaining the variation among
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artificial insemination to a lesbian couple. The partner who was not
inseminated had no legal relation to the biological mother or child.113
Marriage was not yet available to same-sex couples, and the couple had
launched, but not completed, the process of adoption before their
relationship deteriorated.114
The facts of E.N.O. were ideally suited to instituting the doctrine of
de facto parenthood. The couple had planned for one of them to conceive
and “executed a coparenting agreement” that “expressed the parties’ intent
that the [biological mother’s partner] retain her parental status even if the
[couple] were to separate.”115 The biological mother’s partner cared for the
biological mother throughout the pregnancy, acted as her birthing coach,
cut the umbilical cord, and took primary financial and domestic
responsibility while the biological mother was ill.116 The child addressed
the two women as “Mommy” and “Mama.”117
When the child was three, the adults’ relationship ended and the
biological mother attempted to terminate contact between her ex-partner
and child.118 The ex-partner went to court seeking specific enforcement of
the co-parenting agreement, including leave to adopt the child and
establishment of a custody and visitation order.119 The trial judge denied
the biological mother’s motion to dismiss and established a temporary

jurisdictions as to whether the legal parent is on the same footing as the de facto, or
otherwise equitable, parent). Carlos Ball has argued that once a person is deemed a de facto
parent, courts should treat that person the same as the legal parent. BALL, THE RIGHT TO BE
PARENTS, supra note 102, at 114. The latest version of the UPA (2017) includes a de facto
parenthood provision according to which de facto parents, once adjudicated as such, “can
be recognized as legal parents who stand in parity with any other legal parents, including
genetic parents, for all purposes.” Joslin, supra note 42, at 602 (citing UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT § 609 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017)).
113. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 888–89.
114. Id. at 889.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 888–89.
117. Id. at 889.
118. Id. Gay and lesbian civil rights lawyers came to call this sadly familiar scenario
“lesbians behaving badly.” Cf. BALL, THE RIGHT TO BE PARENTS, supra note 102, at 89,
102 (discussing how the major LGBT advocacy organizations decided that even though
cases like these typically involve two gay or lesbian people, the pro-gay position was to
represent de facto parents against biological parents who terminated contact between their
ex-lovers and their children, and—when representing lesbians going through dissolution
processes—to refuse to argue that non-biological, functional parents had no standing
because they lacked a biological relation to a child).
119. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 889.
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visitation order “in the child’s best interests.”120 The order was vacated by
a judge on the Massachusetts Appeals Court, reinstated by a single justice
of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), and then affirmed by
the full court.121
To reach its conclusion, the SJC had to overcome a significant hurdle.
Just a few years before, it had come to the opposite result in a nearly
identical case, C.M. v. P.R.122 In C.M., the non-biological parent had
resided with the mother and child and performed every parental
function.123 When his relationship with the mother ended and the mother
attempted to terminate contact between him and the child, he sought
visitation and an order of paternity but lost.124 C.M. differed from E.N.O.
in two respects: first, the plaintiff in C.M. was a man, and second, the
plaintiff in C.M. “had not been part of the decision to create a family by
bringing the child into the world.”125
Justice Fried of the Massachusetts SJC126 dissented in E.N.O. and
charged the majority with subterfuge, noting that while purporting to apply
the best interest standard, the majority was actually enforcing a contract
between the parties and was doing so because the case involved a samesex couple.127 The majority never explicitly stated that it was granting
specific enforcement of the co-parenting agreement,128 but it did find that
the agreement “revealed [the parents’] beliefs regarding the child’s best
interests.”129 Fried argued that the “parties’ . . . agreements . . . ha[d] no
bearing on determining the child’s best interests but only . . . the
expectations of the mother’s former partner.”130 Indeed, when the majority
120. Id.
121. Id. at 888.
122. C.M. v. P.R., 649 N.E.2d 154 (Mass. 1995).
123. Id. at 154–55.
124. Id. at 155.
125. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 891.
126. Charles Fried has long since returned to his academic post at Harvard Law School.
See
Charles
Fried
Faculty
Profile,
HARVARD
LAW
SCHOOL,
https://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10288/Fried (last visited July 15, 2018).
127. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 895–96 (Fried, J., dissenting).
128. See T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 2004), specifically disclaiming the
existence of “parenthood by contract” in Massachusetts. This case occurred in the context
of a lesbian dissolution in which the plaintiff sued her ex-partner for child support for a
child she conceived using anonymously donated sperm. Id. at 1246. The claim was based
on an implied contract. Id. No biological, adoptive, or de facto parenting relationship
existed between the child and the defendant. Id.
129. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 892.
130. Id. at 896 (Fried, J., dissenting).
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defended itself by arguing that the agreement was not being specifically
enforced but merely read to inform the court of the parties’ belief about
best interests, it set up a syllogism. If a co-parenting agreement, ostensibly
supplanted by a best-interest analysis, effectively determines best interest,
then the court’s best interest determination can hardly be differentiated
from specific enforcement. Moreover, Fried reasoned, “events occurring
during the child’s life are more relevant to the child’s well-being than
decisions or arrangements concluded between the mother and her partner
before the child’s birth.”131 The co-parenting agreement should have been
irrelevant, and the plaintiffs in C.M. and E.N.O., Fried concluded, should
have been treated the same.132
The child’s best interest in E.N.O. happily coincided with the
intentions of the two women and the functional role that the non-biological
mother played in the child’s life. This enabled the SJC to point to best
interests while enforcing the understanding of the parties. The importance
of Fried’s dissent, however, is that it reveals de facto parenthood to be, in
the end, a creature of contract.133 The non-biological mother’s de facto
parent status was predicated on a combination of the co-parenting
agreement and the facts of the child’s rearing, including function and the
biological parent’s consent. The former is an express contract, and the
latter is a contract implied in fact.134 This is precisely the direction in which
scholars of gay and lesbian family law have been pushing. Rather than
determining parenthood status based foremost on biology, scholars of gay
131. Id.
132. Id. at 896–97.
133. It is worth noting that while contracts cannot, according to established law,
override a child’s best interest, agreements regarding custody and support are approved by
courts all the time, so long as the child’s best interest is not compromised. See, e.g., In re
Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 305–06 (Ohio 2011) (recognizing that a legal parent can share
custody with a non-legal parent by agreement).
Further, two phases of judicial deliberation are to be distinguished: (1) determination of
parentage, i.e., who has the status of parent and therefore is vested with due process rights;
and (2) what the custody arrangements will be. Theoretically, the latter is determined by
the best interest standard, not the former. De facto parenthood is doctrinally awkward,
because it does not fit perfectly into one of these two distinct phases. In E.N.O., the
biological mother argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction even to consider the nonbiological mother’s claim because only the biological mother was a parent. E.N.O., 711
N.E.2d at 889–90. The SJC determined that the trial court properly exercised its broad
equitable jurisdiction based on the child’s best interest—a determination that ordinarily
would be expected to come later, in the second phase. Id. at 890.
134. “A promise that is implied in fact is merely a tacit promise, one that is inferred in
whole or in part from expressions other than words on the part of a promisor.” 1 JOSEPH
M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §1.18 (rev. ed. 1993).
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and lesbian family law would have courts examine the intentions of the
same-sex couple, the non-biological parent’s performance of parenting
functions, and the biological parent’s consent to the non-biological
parent’s performance of those functions. In other words, scholars seek a
move from status to contract. Have we seen this anywhere before?

V.

FROM STATUS TO CONTRACT

“[T]he movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a
movement from Status to Contract.”135 So wrote Sir Henry Sumner Maine
in the middle of the nineteenth century, giving us an axiom, albeit one the
meaning and accuracy of which is the subject of some dispute.136 By
status, Maine meant “the particular place into which an individual had
been born as part of a given family or kinship group exhaustively
determined that individual’s legal standing: their prospects of trade and
marriage and the entitlement to decide what happened to their property
after death.”137 Contemporary authors observe that “‘[s]tatus’ today is used
in a broader sense than Maine had originally intended. It has come to be
understood as encompassing both ‘ascribed’ and ‘achieved’ conditions”138
such as employer or employee, which—if in one sense a “status”—is
nonetheless “achieved” by contract.139 Maine, however, was explicit that
in his usage, the term did not refer “to such conditions as are the immediate
or remote result of agreement . . . .”140

135. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY
HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 165 (Beacon Press 1863)
(1861).
136. See, e.g., Robert Redfield, Maine’s Ancient Law in the Light of Primitive Society,
2 W. POL. Q. 574, 577 (criticizing Maine on anthropological grounds); Bernard S. Cohn,
From Indian Status to British Contract, 21 J. ECON. HIST. 613, 628 (1961) (observing that
the axiom derives from the limited context studied by Maine).
137. Katharina Isabel Schmidt, Henry Maine’s “Modern Law”: From Status to
Contract and Back Again?, 65 AMER. J. COMP. L., 145, 151 (2017).
138. Id. at 148; see also J. Russell VerSteeg, From Status to Contract: A Contextual
Analysis of Maine’s Famous Dictum, 10 WHITTIER L. REV. 669, 677 (1989) (lamenting the
over-interpretation of Maine’s concept of status by commentators).
139. Cf. R.H. Graveson, The Movement from Status to Contract, 4 MOD. L. REV. 261,
267–270 (1941) (demonstrating the imperfection of the categories and arguing that
regulation of industry and corporations, including relationship of employer to employee,
represented a shift back in the direction of status).
140. MAINE, supra note 135, at 165.
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According to Maine’s view, even marriage did not count as a status
because it is achieved.141 Maine’s conception of status is derived
principally from the conditions of one’s birth.142 His exclusion of marriage
came under particular criticism due to extensive changes in the mid-to-late
nineteenth century that affected the rights of married women.143 Moreover,
as evidenced by Lord Mansfield’s Rule, marriage effectively determined
paternity prior to the advent of genetic testing, as legitimacy was a status
determined by whether one was born to a marriage. Marriage, one could
therefore say, was always a hidden feature of status in Maine’s work. Still,
in the limited sense in which Maine used the term, e.g., being born female,
a slave, an eldest son, etc., status was what determined a person’s rights
and obligations in the least evolved legal systems.
Though Maine’s axiom was descriptive, he also viewed the shift from
status to contract as progress. As the appointed “Anglo-Indian
Administrator,” Maine spent most of the 1860s “tasked with replacing
[India’s] alleged status based social order with Western-style legal rules”
favoring individual autonomy.144 He viewed the move as evidence of an
improving “moral consciousness.”145
Advocates of an increased role for intent and function in parentage
determinations are effectively pushing for the same kind of progress
heralded by Maine. Contractual concepts such as these would increasingly
alter parenthood so that sex, biology, and marriage would be drained of
determinative power in favor of individual autonomy, manifested in prebirth co-parenting agreements and contracts implied in fact. Like Maine,
contemporary scholars of gay and lesbian family law regard the shift as
both an apt description of how progress for gay and lesbian people has
occurred and a prescription for further advancement.146

141. Graveson, supra note 139, at 262.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 262, 267. On the demise of coverture, see NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS:
A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 52–55 (2000).
144. Schmidt, supra note 137, at 151–52.
145. Id. at 151.
146. NeJaime, Nature, supra note 10, at 2268; NeJaime, New Parenthood, supra note
107, at 1196.
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VI. CONTRACTUAL BASES FOR GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTHOOD: A
FEW CAUTIONARY THOUGHTS
Reliance on biology cannot help but disadvantage persons in samesex couples who intend to co-parent with a biological parent. Moreover,
reliance on marriage as a guide to parental rights poses risks to the
unmarried, and maternal primacy as the key determinative factor erects
obstacles for men, both gay and straight. For these reasons, a shift towards
intent and function may well hold the most promise for many gay and
lesbian would-be parents. Still, it is worth pausing to consider the hazards
associated with this form of advancement.
A.

Remembering Critiques of Contract

In some fields, such as the law of consumer credit,147 the increasing
importance of contract has proven disadvantageous to weaker parties.
Consumers, who are less savvy than credit card companies and have little
to no input into the terms of their credit card contracts, can find themselves
contending with unexpected increases in interest rates, waivers of rights to
judicial relief in favor of forced arbitration, and mysterious fees.148
In the context of family relations, a number of legal writers have
proposed a shift toward contract, with the hope that such a move would
enhance freedom and autonomy and offer the possibility of equalizing
heterosexual relations.149 Not all scholars of family law, however, are
optimistic about the promise of contract to deliver these benefits. Some
have expressed the concern that weaker family members face inequities
analogous to those faced by consumers and other disadvantaged
bargainers. As Martha Minow and Mary Lyndon Shanley have argued,

147. See generally Rashmi Dyal-Chand, From Status to Contract: Evolving Paradigms
for Regulating Consumer Credit, 73 TENN. L. REV. 303 (2006) (discussing the role of
bargaining power in the consumer credit industry).
148. See id. at 335–37.
149. See generally MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES: HOW FORMAL AND
INFORMAL CONTRACTS SHAPE ALL KINDS OF FAMILIES (2015).
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While private ordering has liberating aspects, it also entails more
worrisome implications. The assumption that bargains will be freely
struck masks configurations of social power that provide the backdrop to
any contracts. Generations of labor leaders have pointed out the fallacy
of assuming that workers and employers were equally free bargaining
agents.150

The problem is that “[c]ontractual ordering does not alter those
background economic and social conditions that curtail the freedom of
some and enhance that of others, that create relationships of domination
and subordination between men and women as well as between rich and
poor.”151
Prenuptial agreements, which enable divorcing spouses to supplant
state law with privately negotiated terms, have been lauded by some as
furthering individual autonomy and shedding antiquated notions of
women’s inability to bargain for their own interests.152 Some feminists,
however, have remained skeptical. As one writer observed, “premarital
agreements generally disadvantage the economically vulnerable spouse by
precluding the protections offered by state law . . . .”153 Available data
“strongly suggests that premarital agreements generally harm women and
the children in their care.”154 Older men often enter such agreements with
their younger brides, who have far less wealth and bargaining power in
any negotiation.155
In the domain of same-sex parenting, the risks of relying on contract
theory may have less to do with unfair terms negotiated under conditions
of unequal bargaining power and more to do with the question of
enforcement—i.e., whether a contract is found to exist in the first place. A
seminal article by Clare Dalton illustrates this danger.156 Dalton highlights
the nineteenth-century Pennsylvania case of Hertzog v. Hertzog,157 where
“an adult son lived and worked with his father until his father’s death, at

150. Martha Minow & Mary Lyndon Shanley, Relational Rights and Responsibilities:
Revisioning the Family in Liberal Political Theory and Law, 11 HYPATIA 4, 11 (1996).
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990).
153. Gail F. Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
229, 238 (1994).
154. Id. at 241.
155. See id. at 243.
156. Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J.
997 (1985).
157. Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465 (1857).
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which point the son sued the estate for compensation for services
rendered.”158 The question in the case was whether the father’s estate owed
a contractual obligation to compensate the son, John.159 A witness
“testified that he ‘heard the old man say he would pay John for the labour
he had done.’”160 The jury understood these words to indicate the existence
of a contract, but the estate appealed the jury’s decision and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court read the testimony quite differently.161 The
court found that “[t]his is no making of a contract or admission of one; but
rather the contrary. It admits that the son deserved some reward, but not
that he had a contract for any.”162 To reach this conclusion, the court read
the words in light of the father-son relationship, explaining
If we find . . . that a stranger has been in the employment of another, we
immediately infer a contract for hiring . . . . But if we find a son in the
employment of his father . . . we do not infer a contract of hiring, because
the principle of family affection is sufficient to account for the family
association, and does not demand the inference of a contract.163

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court read the witness testimony through the
filter of a preconceived notion about the nature of father-son relationships;
namely, that father-son relationships are not ones of contractual
exchange.164 The existence of a contract, Dalton argued, was rooted in a
judicial understanding of the relational context in which the events
occurred.165
Judicial conceptions of interpersonal relationships pose obvious
dangers to gay and lesbian people, whose intimate partnerships have too
often been viewed by judges as roommate relationships or improper
relations. Intent is only as good as its signifiers, and its signifiers are only
as good as their interpreter.
Of course, judicial goggles can facilitate or impede recognition of
gay and lesbian familial intent, and in our current historical moment of
increasing equality, it might not be the hurdle it once was. State courts’
willingness to recognize de facto parents was testament to a judicial
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Dalton, supra note 156, at 1015 (quoting Hertzog, 29 Pa. at 465).
Id.
Id. (quoting Hertzog, 29 Pa. at 465).
See id.
Id. at 1017 (quoting Hertzog, 29 Pa. at 470).
Id. (quoting Hertzog, 29 Pa. at 469).
See id. at 1017.
See id. at 1017–18.
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disposition to view gay and lesbian relationships in a tolerant light well
before Obergefell.
This kind of attitudinal shift has also occurred in other contexts. In
the pivotal 1976 case of Marvin v. Marvin,166 the California Supreme
Court ushered in new tolerance for the reality of non-marital cohabitation.
A longstanding common law doctrine prohibited enforcement of so-called
“meretricious contracts” where sex formed part of the consideration.167 In
Marvin, a woman who had cohabited with a man for seven years before
being kicked out of his house sought a share of property accumulated
solely in the man’s name over the course the relationship.168 Lacking the
protections of marriage, she asserted express and implied contract claims
based on her career sacrifices and household contributions and his alleged
promise to support her169—claims that might have been expected to fail
given the intimate nature of the relationship and the ban on meretricious
contracts. The California Supreme Court permitted her claims to proceed,
however, based “on the principle that adults who voluntarily live together
and engage in sexual relations are nonetheless as competent as any other
persons to contract respecting their earnings and property rights . . . [s]o
long as the agreement does not rest upon illicit meretricious
consideration.”170
The Marvin court urged other courts to keep up with changing
attitudes and practices. The court stated that “we believe that the
prevalence of nonmarital relationships in modern society and the social
acceptance of them, marks this as a time when our courts should by no
means apply the doctrine of the unlawfulness of the so-called meretricious
relationship to the instant case.”171 The court further stated that “[t]he
mores of the society have indeed changed so radically in regard to
cohabitation that we cannot impose a standard based on alleged moral
considerations that have apparently been so widely abandoned by so
many.”172 Conceding these grounds for its decision, the California court

166. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (1976).
167. See id. at 116.
168. Id. at 110.
169. See id. at 111–12, 116.
170. Id. at 116. The plaintiff in Marvin, while prevailing on the motion to dismiss,
eventually lost on the merits. See Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 556–57 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981).
171. Marvin, 18 P.2d at 122.
172. Id.
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cleared the way for the plaintiff to advance claims of both express and
implied contract.
The E.N.O. court made a nearly identical statement when it
recognized the de facto parent. Specifically, the E.N.O. court stated:
The recognition of de facto parents is in accord with notions of the
modern family. An increasing number of same gender couples, like the
plaintiff and the defendant, are deciding to have children. It is to be
expected that children of nontraditional families, like other children,
form parent relationships with both parents, whether those parents are
legal or de facto.173

Justice Fried saw this as a tell that belied the pretense of not having
enforced the co-parenting agreement.174 Read in a more favorable light,
this statement was a frank admission by the majority of the values it
brought to its deliberations.
Judicial values can also cut the other way, as demonstrated by
Dalton.175 Contrast Hewitt v. Hewitt,176 a decision issued out of Illinois just
three years after Marvin. Hewitt concerned facts similar to those in
Marvin, but the Illinois court held very different views toward the
increasingly widespread practice of non-marital cohabitation. Squashing
any possibility of a contractual claim, that court wondered:
Will the fact that legal rights closely resembling those arising from
conventional marriages can be acquired by those who deliberately
choose to enter into what have heretofore been commonly referred to as
“illicit” or “meretricious” relationships encourage formation of such
relationships and weaken marriage as the foundation of our family-based
society?177

The decision suggests that the Hewitt court’s answer was yes.
If contractual concepts such as intent and function are to gain
determinative power at the expense of status-based concepts such as
biological relation, marriage, and sex, we have to be prepared for the range
of biases that inevitably will flow through the process of parentage

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999).
See id. at 895 (Fried, J., dissenting).
See Dalton, supra note 156, at 1017–18.
Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979).
Id. at 1207.
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determinations.178 As Jessica Feinberg has argued, the advent of same-sex
marriage and the opening of avenues to gay and lesbian adoption may lead
some lawmakers and judges “to conclude that now that such parents have
access to formal avenues to establishing legal parent status, equity no
longer requires application or adoption of equitable parenthood
doctrines;”179 i.e., where the parties have not married or adopted, same-sex
intimate partnerships and gay and lesbian co-parents are at risk of not
being recognized for what they are. This is a legitimate concern.
The contrary possibility is worth considering, as well. Some courts
might, in their zeal to find parental rights and responsibilities, sometimes
assign them where they were not intended. In a story entitled What Makes
a Parent?, Ian Parker told the harrowing tale of a lesbian in New York
City who adopted a child after breaking up with her lover.180 The two
women remained close, and the ex-lover spent time with the child and
grew attached.181 The day the mother was due to move with her child to
her native England, she was summoned to court to respond to a petition
from her ex-lover asserting parentage.182 Every conceivable email and
witness account of the relationship between the women, the relationship
between the ex-lover and child, and the extent to which the women
characterized themselves as family, was entered into evidence.183 While
the court found against the petitioner, it did take the child’s passport and
force the mother to endure a lengthy, costly, and terrifying trial.184
Such a case could easily have been reversed. The mother could have
sought a declaration of parentage and a child support order from her exlover, who might never have intended to be a parent but nonetheless
functioned enough like one to capture the court’s imagination.185 As
178. Another way to frame this is that status rooted in biology provides a rule, while
questions of intent and function are determined by reference to standards, and are therefore
more discretionary (though the application of rules and their exceptions can admit judicial
discretion, as well). See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (exploring the distinction between legal rules
and standards).
179. Feinberg, supra note 42, at 57.
180. See Ian Parker, What Makes a Parent?, THE NEW YORKER (May 22, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/22/what-makes-a-parent.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. The article concludes with an appeal pending. See id.
185. So far, the trend has not been in favor of courts assigning child support duties
without a biological link, though nothing precludes a turn in that direction as contractual
concepts gain more and more traction. Still, surveying the case law, Leslie Joan Harris
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Duncan Kennedy has shown, the orthodoxy of intent as the basis of
obligation can be followed by findings of “implied intent” and the
assignment of duties implied in fact or in law.186 Doctrinal evolution in
this direction effectively substitutes judicial assessments of moral
obligation for private intentions.
To the extent that gay and lesbian parenting rights increasingly rely
on contract, critiques of contract should be on our radar. Issues of
bargaining power, indeterminacy of judicial decision-making, and the
slippage between intent and “implied intent” are all worth careful
attention.
B.

Norm Production and the Diverse Gay and Lesbian Community

My primary concern, however, is that the gay and lesbian community
is diverse, and not everyone is likely to advance on the same terms. We
should turn a more scrutinizing eye to the question of how exactly intent
and function are understood. Homophobic readings are not the only hazard
for which we ought to be on the lookout. What aspects of intentional and
functional parenting relationships will surface as determinative? As
advocates pursue what has emerged as the consensus strategic direction,
what norms187 have they been generating along the way? Who within the
gay and lesbian community is most likely to benefit from those norms and
who is at risk of exclusion?

observed, “biological parenthood is usually controlling when the issue is liability for child
support. Functioning as a parent is considered, if at all, only when the primary issue is
custody or access to a child.” Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the
Clash Between Custody and Child Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611, 612 (2009).
186. DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 163–67
(2006), https://bit.ly/2LIPoX7.
187. I invoke the term “norm” according to its usage in critical social thought,
especially by Michel Foucault, Michael Warner, and Janet Halley. A norm is a fulcrum, or
as Halley explains, a “distinction” or “standard” around which a “social, conceptual, and
ethical field” is organized. Janet Halley, Recognition, Rights, Regulation, Normalisation:
Rhetorics of Justification in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF
SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
97, 100 n.7 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenæs eds., 2001). The term here is meant to
probe how specific aspects of relationships—e.g., whether an adult has financially
supported a child—have (or will) come to define what it means to be an intentional and/or
functional parent, so that the equitable concept of parenthood turns on specific relational
factors that may not be equally accessible across the internally diverse gay and lesbian
population.
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A standout in the lineage of the family’s functional definition is the
case Miguel Braschi v. Stahl Associates Company.188 The events of this
case took place during the peak of the AIDS crisis for gay men in New
York City. Leslie Blanchard was the tenant of record in a rent-controlled
apartment.189 When he died, his longtime intimate partner, Miguel
Braschi, wished to stay.190 The landlord, however, had an incentive to
evict, as the rent control law provided for “vacancy decontrol”—that is, a
return to market-based rent after a tenant vacates the premises.191 If the
tenant of record died, “noneviction protection” extended to the “surviving
spouse of the deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased
tenant’s family who ha[d] been living with the tenant.”192 Decades before
the advent of same-sex marriage in New York, the court had to determine
whether Braschi was a member of Blanchard’s family.
The sympathetic New York court marshaled the facts to make the
case that he was, noting that:
Appellant and Blanchard lived together as permanent life partners for
more than 10 years. They regarded one another, and were regarded by
friends and family, as spouses. The two men’s families were aware of
the nature of the relationship, and they regularly visited each other’s
families and attended family functions together, as a couple. . ..
[A]ppellant’s tenancy was known to the building’s superintendent and
doormen, who viewed the two men as a couple.
Financially, the two men shared all obligations including a household
budget. The two were authorized signatories of three safe-deposit boxes,
they maintained joint checking and savings accounts, and joint credit
cards. In fact, rent was often paid with a check from their joint checking
account. Additionally, Blanchard executed a power of attorney in
appellant’s favor so that appellant could make necessary decisions—
financial, medical and personal—for him during his illness. Finally,
appellant was the named beneficiary of Blanchard’s life insurance
policy, as well as the primary legatee and coexecutor of Blanchard’s
estate.193

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
Id. at 50.
Id. at 50–51.
See id. at 52 (explaining the structure of the New York City rent control law).
Id. (quoting now-abrogated New York City regulation).
Id. at 55.
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Braschi was an early and important victory for the recognition of samesex relationships based on their functional reality, but whose relationships
are most easily seen by this standard?
The first and second paragraphs emphasize the recognition that
Braschi and Blanchard were fortunate to have from their families and
people in their building. Not everyone enjoys this kind of community
support, though we can hope that with time, more and more will. In the
meantime, gay and lesbian people living in the “closet,” or even in an
environment where such easy recognition is less common, will have one
less argument.
The third paragraph raises what may be a more intransigent concern.
Financial support and interdependence has surfaced as an important factor
in functional family law cases. Braschi and Blanchard jointly held all
manner of accounts and safe-deposit boxes.194 The briefs stressed this
evidence of their interdependence. As amicus, Lambda described such
accounts as “financial necessities of life,”195 despite the fact that plenty of
people do not have them.
The non-biological parent in E.N.O. financially supported her family,
and this counted in her favor in the de facto parenthood assessment.196
Paternity cases going back at least to Lehr specifically look to financial
support when determining a biological, non-marital father’s rights, so this
factor has a sturdy lineage. While financially supporting one’s partner or
children undoubtedly evidences one’s sense of responsibility toward them,
it is much easier to point to this evidence when one has a regular and
substantial income. Unemployed and low-income people, as recent critics
of the child support regime have argued, often cannot afford to provide
regular support.197 Poor people with court-ordered child support
obligations often become trapped in mounting debt, including interest and
penalties, and may even find themselves behind bars.198 Against this
194. See id.
195. Brief Amicus Curiae of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund in Support of
Plaintiff-Appellant 4, Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (No. 0219487) (on file with author). Lambda also pointed to the fact that the couple had “traveled
together extensively.” Id. Obviously, extensive travel is less likely in the case of a lowincome couple and may also prove difficult for mixed immigration-status families.
196. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892 (Mass. 1999).
197. See Libby Adler & Janet Halley, You Pay, You Play: Feminists and Child Support
Enforcement in the United States, in JANET HALLEY, PRABHA KOTISWARAN, HILA SHAMIR,
& RACHEL REBOUCHÉ, GOVERNANCE FEMINISM: NOTES FROM THE FIELD (forthcoming, U.
Minn. Press 2019).
198. Id.
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reality, reliance on a history of financial support for non-legal parents is
likely to damage the interests of low-income would-be de facto parents.
Relatedly, Braschi and Blanchard had access to costly professionals
to prepare their wills and powers of attorney. For low-income sectors of
the community, it is difficult to generate this kind of evidence of functional
coupledom. The same holds true for co-parenting agreements, assuming
they are executed with the benefit of legal advice and/or drafting.
Undoubtedly, such instruments are the strongest evidence of joint
planning, but that kind of evidence can be pricey.
Indeed, the criterion of planning itself, emphasized in E.N.O. in order
to distinguish C.M.,199 may disadvantage low-income and AfricanAmerican gay and lesbian people. Assisted reproductive technologies and
private (including international) adoptions are cost-prohibitive for lowincome people. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that low-income
and African-American same-sex families are in fact less likely to be
planned. According to the Williams Institute, African-American gay and
lesbian people are concentrated in locales outside of the urban coastal
areas.200 Same-sex couples living in the South, Midwest, or Mountain
states are more likely than their counterparts in coastal cities to be raising
children, but less likely to be raising adopted children,201 which is “likely
reflective of . . . different sex relationships earlier in life.”202 Planning, it
seems, may be a class-based, racially, and regionally selective luxury.203
The Braschi court also indicated that one of the factors to be
considered in determining whether a non-marital intimate partner was
“family” for purposes of protection against eviction was the “exclusivity
and longevity” of the relationship.204 The E.N.O. court, too, in determining
199. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 891–92.
200. Amira Hasenbush, Andrew R. Flores, Angeliki Kastanis, Brad Sears & Gary J.
Gates, The LGBT Divide: A Data Portrait of LGBT People in the Midwestern, Mountain
& Southern States, UCLA WILLIAMS INST. 7 (Dec. 2014), https://williamsinstitute.
law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-divide-Dec-2014.pdf; Angeliki Kastanis & Gary
J. Gates, LGBT African-Americans and African-American Same-Sex Couples, UCLA
WILLIAMS INST. (Oct. 2013), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/census-lgbtdemographics-studies/lgbt-african-american-oct-2013/.
201. Hasenbush et al., supra note 200, at 2.
202. Id.
203. Jessica Feinberg has made a similar point with regard to formal methods of
attaining parenthood status, such as marriage and adoption. See Feinberg, supra note 42,
at 91–95. This is an important point, but should be recognized as an equally significant
issue in the context of de facto parenthood.
204. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989). The brief for the
New York City Bar Association, written in part by well-known LGBT advocate Art

ADLER - FINAL EDITS (DO NOT DELETE)

12/10/2018 4:52 PM

2018] INCONCEIVABLE: A LEGAL BASIS FOR GAY & LESBIAN PARENTHOOD

37

de facto parentage, observed that the couple in that case had “shared a
committed, monogamous relationship for thirteen years.”205 If regarded as
a criterion, monogamy disadvantages some relational arrangements over
others. Gay men disproportionately choose to maintain sexually nonexclusive relationships while still committed to one another.206 Advocates
should take a long look at the lifestyle diversity among their constituents
and decide if this moral line is the right one to be offering to courts.
The Braschi court also referred to the “everyday lives” of couples
seeking to establish themselves as “family.”207 Similarly, in E.N.O., the
Massachusetts court mentioned “the plaintiff had daily contact with the
child and ‘acted in the capacity [of] his other parent in all aspects of his
life.’”208 This factor goes to the heart of the functional ideal, and rightly so
given the premium on the child’s bond with the parent. It is still worth
considering, however, whether some well-meaning gay and lesbian
would-be parents will fail to satisfy the standard because they are in the
military, work two jobs that keep them out of the home for a double shift,
work nights and sleep during the day, or work erratically—say as an Uber
driver or in some other capacity in the “gig economy.”
How would it change the Braschi case if the two men had a nonmonogamous arrangement; not enough money, property, or credit to
maintain accounts, credit cards, or safe deposit boxes; not enough money
to pay a lawyer to draft a power of attorney or other pertinent documents,
and no supportive family members? Would the de facto parenthood
doctrine have applied in E.N.O. if the non-biological mother did not have
the money to hire a lawyer to draft the co-parenting agreement, and if she
were on deployment in Iraq when the umbilical cord needed cutting?
The gay and lesbian legal advocacy community fully appreciates the
distributive implications of choosing a basis for parentage when
contrasting people in heterosexual relationships with those in same-sex
relationships, when marital status is determinative, and to a lesser extent,
when fathers are contrasted with mothers. It is not at all evident, however,
Leonard, led the court to look at exclusivity and pointed to the “exclusive relationship” of
Braschi and Blanchard no less than three times. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York In Support of Plaintiff-Appellant 4, 6, 13, Braschi v.
Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (No. 02194-87) (on file with author).
205. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 888 (Mass. 1999).
206. See generally Colleen H. Hoff & Sean C. Beaugher, Sexual Agreements Among
Gay Male Couples, 39 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 774 (2010).
207. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 55.
208. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d. at 889.
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that the distributive implications along axes of race, class, region, or
lifestyle have come into focus. As the movement pushes in the direction
of contractual concepts such as intent and function, all of these dimensions
should be on the table. The picture of the intended, functional family that
advocates and sympathetic courts paint will continue to produce norms.
How will those norms differentially affect gay and lesbian people across
the array of factors that render the community internally diverse? The track
we are on poses dangers to the most marginalized members of that
community where it hurts most: their status as parents and the basis upon
which their emotional bonds with their children will be recognized—or
not.
VII. CONCLUSION
Over the past three decades, gay and lesbian legal advocates have
been unmatched at acquiring rights against discrimination, to privacy, to
marriage equality, etc. They have not always been as good, however, at
thinking through issues of distribution, particularly within the LGBTQ
community. Our interests sometimes diverge and can even conflict.209 This
can happen between gay men and lesbians (as Pavan illustrates), between
predominantly white gay gentrifiers and LGBTQ youth of color (as
struggles over curfews and police harassment in urban neighborhoods,
such as Greenwich Village, illustrate210), and between “the Good Gay” and
“the Bad Queer” (as Michael Warner has shown in the context of
marriage211). A win is not always a win for everybody, and one LGBTQ
person’s win may even be a hindrance to fair legal treatment of another.
Scholars and advocates should consider the widest possible array of costs
and benefits that could accrue to differently-situated LGBTQ people when
advancing a theory of parenthood. The difficult strategic decisions that
must be made in the name of LGBTQ advancement might well hurt some
people even as they help others. This is a brutal fact of most legal advocacy
and cannot be avoided. Such strategizing should not be done, however, in
a way that is heedless of the many differences among us, or that leaves an
209. See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: “You Are Entering a Gay and
Lesbian Free Zone”: On the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers
[Raising Questions about Lawrence, Sex Wars, and the Criminal Law], 94 J. OF CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 503 (2004) (wildly fragmenting the stakes in Lawrence v. Texas).
210. See CHRISTINA B. HANHARDT, SAFE SPACE: GAY NEIGHBORHOOD HISTORY AND
THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE 185–220 (2013).
211. See MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE
ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 109–16 (1999).
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unintended distribution whereby the most privileged members of the
community reap the benefit while leaving the most marginalized—by race,
class, region, and sexual practice—behind.

